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Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role
of Bank Capital Regulation
Abstract
This paper studies how capital requirements inﬂuence a bank’s mode of entry into
foreign ﬁnancial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank
that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of
multinational banking over oﬀering cross-border ﬁnancial services depends on the
beneﬁt and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The beneﬁt is that it allows
to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes ineﬃciencies in internal capital
markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries.
Capital requirements aﬀect this trade-oﬀ by inﬂuencing the degree of ineﬃciency in
internal capital markets.
Keywords: incomplete ﬁnancial contracting; cross-border ﬁnancial services;
multinational banking; liquidity allocation; capital regulation.
JEL-Codes: F21, F23, G21
Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie untersucht, wie Eigenkapitalregulierungen die Internationalisie-
rungsstrategien von Banken beeinﬂussen. Es wird ein Modell einer international
operierenden Bank entwickelt, die Liquidit¨ at schaﬀt und l¨ anderspeziﬁsche Liqui-
dit¨ atsschocks ausgleicht. Der Vorteil von Auslandsdirektinvestitionen von Banken
gegen¨ uber grenz¨ uberschreitenden Bankdienstleistungen h¨ angt von den Vor- und
Nachteilen lokaler Marktkenntnisse ab. W¨ ahrend diese Kenntnisse es erlauben, mehr
Liquidit¨ at zu schaﬀen, f¨ uhren sie zu Ineﬃzienzen auf internen Kapitalm¨ arkten, auf
die eine multinationale Bank angewiesen ist, um die Liquidit¨ at zwischen L¨ andern
auszugleichen. Eigenkapitalregulierungen beeinﬂussen diesen trade-oﬀ, indem sie
das Ausmaß von Ineﬃzienzen interner Kapitalm¨ arkte ver¨ andern.
Schlagw¨ orter: unvollst¨ andige Finanzvertr¨ age; grenz¨ uberschreitende Finanzdienst-
leistungen; Auslandsdirektinvestitionen im Bankensektor; Liquidit¨ atsallokation;
Eigenkapitalregulierung.
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This paper analyzes the following three interrelated questions: What determines the
internationalization strategies of internationally active banks? What eﬀects do the
diﬀerent internationalization strategies have on the stability and eﬃciency of the
international banking system? How do capital requirements inﬂuence the interna-
tionalization strategy of internationally active banks? As regards the internation-
alization strategies, we contrast the two conceivable modes of foreign market entry.
The ﬁrst is supplying cross-border ﬁnancial services, in which a globally operating
banker oﬀers deposit-taking and lending services directly to foreigners. The second
mode is multinational banking, in which a bank establishes and operates through
legally and organizationally independent foreign subsidiaries, each run by a local
bank manager.
These questions aim at reassessing whether the Basel framework for the international
convergence of capital measurement and capital standards for internationally active
banks is appropriately designed to achieve its objectives. According to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, the main objective is to further strengthen
the soundness and stability of the international banking system, while ensuring
that it will not cause competitive inequality among internationally active banks
(Basel Committee 2005). When formulating the rules, the Committee decided to
not distinguish between banks with diﬀerent modes of foreign market entry. But
what if the stability of the international banking system depends on the banks’
internationalization strategies, and if, in addition, the existing rules do have an
eﬀect on these strategies? The Basel framework then needs not be in accordance
with competitive equality and may impair the stability of the international banking
system.
Our starting point is the incomplete contracts approach to banking developed in a
series of papers by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001, 2005), where banks exist be-
cause they create liquidity. They argue that ﬁnancial claims are illiquid because of
limited pledgeability of returns, which arises when speciﬁc skills of the borrower are
needed to generate them while he cannot commit to contributing his human capital
for the whole lifetime of the claim. A banker, who specializes on acquiring skills
to extract payments from those borrowers by maintaining a strong lending relation-
ship, transforms these otherwise illiquid loans into liquidity by issuing demandable
deposits. Deposits allow her not only to pay out depositors when they need it most,
but—since they are associated with the risk of a run on a bank’s assets—also to
commit herself to pledge her speciﬁc knowledge for future dates.
In order to advance this approach and to apply it to an internationally active bank,
we take two further aspects into account. First, we consider a need for an allocation
of liquidity across countries. Although we do not allow for aggregate liquidity short-
ages, we assume that liquidity may be in short supply in one of the countries where
the bank operates. The function of the bank is thus not only to create liquidity (as
in Diamond and Rajan, op.cit.) but also to allocate it across countries. Second, we
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take into account that, in order to allocate liquidity, an internationally active bank
needs to draw on its internal capital market, the eﬃciency of which depends on the
bank’s organization design. With cross-border ﬁnancial services, a globally operat-
ing banker simply raises funds wherever available and allocates liquidity eﬃciently.
In the case of a multinational banking ﬁrm with legally independent subsidiaries,
the bank’s managers are operating locally. As they are thus intimately linked to
borrowers, local bank managers can create more liquidity than a globally operating
banker. However, in this case there are additional ineﬃciencies associated with the
brought up of an internal capital market. According to Stein (2002), local bank
managers may not be able to transmit soft information to her superior or any other
agent inside the bank. This is because soft information cannot be directly veriﬁed by
anyone other than the agent who produces it. Yet, the ability of a banker to create
liquidity necessarily rests on her superior soft information. The potential beneﬁt
of multinational banking arising from local intimacy of bank managers is thus at
the same time a source of dysfunctionality of internal capital markets as a local
bank manager may not be able to fully pledge her loan earnings to bank managers
operating in other regional markets.
We show that capital regulation aﬀects a bank’s decision on its mode of entry into
foreign markets, as it inﬂuences the degree of ineﬃciency in internal capital markets
for three reasons. The ﬁrst is that, when the imposed capital-to-asset ratio is high,
the investors of a multinational bank bear some of the risk that liquidity is in short
supply when they want to consume. This lowers the need of a local bank manager,
who experiences a regional liquidity shortage, to draw on an ineﬃcient internal cap-
ital market. Second, it also means that, even in the liquidity-rich country, those
investors with a liquidity need cannot squeeze as much out of the potentially sup-
porting bank manager. Hence she has more internally generated funds available to
support the other. Third, as the amount that can be raised against a bank-internal
claim in the liquidity-rich country decreases, the supporting bank manager has less
external funds available.
The idea of imperfect internal capital markets builds on several earlier work on
manufacturing ﬁrms comprising several divisions. The basic assumption in this line
of research is that headquarters exerts control rights over the resources pooled in
a multidivisional ﬁrm (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). Stein (1997) points
to the general beneﬁt of internal capital markets. He argues that headquarters can
create value by picking up winners out of a ﬁrm’s divisions. Albeit this strategy aims
at improving the eﬃciency of capital allocation, it also generates additional adverse
incentives. For example, incentives to exert eﬀort may be weak on the divisional
level (Brusco and Panunzi 2005), or power struggles among division managers may
take place, which hamper eﬃcient allocations (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000).
Concerning disincentives for headquarters, it may not be willing to provide neces-
sary incentives for division managers by means of a wage schedule but by assigning
ineﬃcient capital budgets (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). In addition, integrating
projects may allow headquarters to turn its back on external ﬁnanciers once the
pooling of internally generated cash ﬂows suﬃces in order to ensure follow-up ﬁ-
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nances for at least some of its projects, thereby lowering headquarters’ incentive to
meet its obligations vis-a-vis ﬁnanciers (Inderst and M¨ uller, 2003). However, none of
these papers considers bank-internal enforcement problems and analyzes the eﬀect
of banking regulation on the eﬃciency of internal capital markets, which is the main
focus of our paper.
Another related strand of literature is about the question of why manufacturing ﬁrms
make foreign direct investments (FDI) rather than exporting goods.1 As regards
the international banking ﬁrm, Gray and Gray (1981), Yannapoulos (1983), Sagari
(1992) and Williams (1997) make use of the standard eclectic paradigm of FDI—
originally developed by Dunning (1977, 1981)—to explain the internationalization
of banks on the basis of location-speciﬁc, ownership-speciﬁc and internationaliza-
tion advantages. Similarly, Buch and Lipponer (2004) directly apply a framework
for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s FDI to banks‘ internationalization strategies. Yet, because
these approaches do not take into account the speciﬁc functions that banks (unlike
manufacturing ﬁrms) fulﬁll, they cannot justify the existence of banks at all, whereas
in the model presented below internationally active banks emerge endogenously.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce a basic model of an
internationally active banking ﬁrm. Section 3 deals with the case where the bank
provides cross-border ﬁnancial services to its customers, while section 4 focuses on
multinational banking. In section 5 we further discuss our results, and section 6
summarizes the results.
1 This has been extensively treated in the literature, see, e.g., Markusen (1995), Markusen and
Venables (1998), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003).
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2 A model of an internationally active banking
ﬁrm
We consider an internationally active bank headquartered in, say, London, which
possesses no funds on its own. Since we want to focus only on the comparative
advantage of diﬀerent ways to do business abroad, we abstract from a home bias
in banking activities. The bank is thus assumed to provide its ﬁnancial services to
foreign customers only. Customers consist of investors and entrepreneurs who live
in, e.g., Toulouse and Torino. They are assumed to be resident in the same currency
area, there is thus no exchange rate risk. Besides the operation of the internationally
active bank, ﬁnancial markets of these two regions are assumed to be separated from
each other.2 Although there is only one single bank, the markets for deposits and
other claims on the bank are assumed to be contestable ex ante. All agents are risk
neutral, and the interest rate on an alternative asset (storage) is zero.
There is a continuum of mass 1 of entrepreneurs, one half resident in Toulouse and
the other in Torino. Entrepreneurs have project ideas but no funds on their own.
A single project requires an initial investment of 1 unit of the single consumption
good at t = 0. If the entrepreneur contributes his human capital, his project will
yield a non-veriﬁable return C > 1 either at t = 1 (early projects) or at t = 2 (late
projects). At t = 0 nobody knows the type of a project, but it is common knowledge
that in each region half of the projects turn out to be early.
At t = 0 a continuum of mass 1 of investors lives in both regions, one half in
Toulouse and the other in Torino. Each investor is endowed with 1 unit of the single
consumption good. Although all initial investors need to consume at t = 1, there
are new investors born at t = 1 who may ﬁll in for them. The new generation
of investors is suﬃciently rich such that there is no aggregate liquidity shortage at
t = 1. However, one of the regions may suﬀer from a region-wide liquidity shortage
as new investors are born either in Toulouse or Torino. The probability that the
new generation will emerge in Toulouse is 0.5.
If capital markets were perfect, liquidity could be eﬃciently allocated: At t = 1
retired investors would be partly replaced by new investors, irrespective whether
they are born in Toulouse or Torino, and entrepreneurs with late projects would
thus be shielded from region-speciﬁc liquidity shortages. However, no agent can
commit to contribute his speciﬁc skills in the remote future, which may hamper
this solution. This is because the inalienability of human capital gives an agent
the opportunity to hold up his ﬁnanciers (investors or a bank) by threatening to
not making use of his speciﬁc skills (Hart and Moore, 1994). How ﬁnanciers deal
with such opportunistic behavior depends on what they can do by assuming control
over the assets in the case of default. Following Diamond and Rajan (2005) we
assume that ﬁnanciers have the following two alternatives: First, they may replace
2 Even in the Euro area, the degree of ﬁnancial integration is still low (Baele et al., 2004).
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the original entrepreneur by handing out the assets to another one. The substitute
will then yield only γC with γ < 1, while the time structure of cash ﬂows remains
unchanged. Second, assets may be seized and liquidated at t = 1, where liquidation
yields immediate proceeds of L. We assume
L < 1 < γC < 2L. (1)
The diﬀerence between replacement and liquidation is thus twofold. First, by means
of liquidation ﬁnanciers get some revenues at t = 1 even if the project turns out to
be late. Second, replacing the entrepreneur yields a higher net present value than
liquidation irrespective whether the project is early or late, and only replacement
can guarantee that the initial investment actually pays out. The last inequality in
(1) means that liquidation is, however, generally worthwhile when only half of the
returns associated with replacement can be pledged to ultimate investors.
Both alternative uses require speciﬁc skills. According to Diamond and Rajan
(2001), acquiring these skills is feasible only if a ﬁnancier establishes a strong and
long-lasting lending relationship right from the beginning of the project.3 Investors,
who need to consume early, however, cannot maintain such a strong lending rela-
tionship with entrepreneurs beyond t = 1, while new investors do not share the
information with the retired population of investors. It is therefore optimal to man-
date a banker, who acquires loan collection skills and acts on behalf of investors in
ﬁnancial contracting with the entrepreneur.
As the banker has speciﬁc skills to collect loans, she gains power over her investors
and might hold them up by threatening to not making use of her skills. However,
Diamond and Rajan (2001) have shown that a deposit contract allows the banker
to commit herself to refrain from doing so. This is because the deposit contract
creates a collective action problem among investors that exposes a banker to a run
on her assets if she tries to renege on her obligations vis-a-vis depositors. When,
instead, the banker raises funds by means of equity capital she can extract some
rents at the expense of shareholders. As in Diamond and Rajan (2000) we assume
that if a banker refuses to pay out shareholders the latter come into possession of
the banker’s assets with probability of 0.5. Shareholders can in this case force the
banker to collect the maximum liquidity that is immediately achievable and to fully
pass it on to them. But, shareholders will then also become responsible for paying
out depositors. If shareholders cannot assume control over the banker’s assets, they
get nothing from the banker. In the end, shareholders expect to get half of the
maximum liquidity that is achievable immediately net of deposits.
The eﬀectiveness of skills to ﬁnd an appropriate substitute for the original en-
trepreneur depends on the organization design of the internationally active bank.
We diﬀerentiate between two basic organizational forms. The ﬁrst is when the
banker oﬀers cross-border ﬁnancial services, which refers to a situation where in-
vestors deposit their funds with a globally operating banker in London from where
3 Without loss of generality there are no other costs to acquire loan collection skills.
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she directly grants loans to entrepreneurs in Toulouse and Torino. The second is
multinational banking, where headquarters ﬁrst establishes subsidiaries in Toulouse
and Torino. Investors deposit funds with their local subsidiaries and a local bank
manager is then to grant loans to the entrepreneurs in her respective region.
These two organizational forms diﬀer with respect to the degree of intimacy with
entrepreneurs and their respective projects. A bank manager in Toulouse or Torino
is locally close to the entrepreneur and has thus more information about how to ﬁnd
the best substitute. Hence, a substitute found by a local bank manager can extract
γhC > 1 on behalf of the bank. With cross-border ﬁnancial services, however, a
globally operating banker in London cannot maintain a very strong lending rela-
tionship and her ability to ﬁnd a substitute is more restricted. She is therefore only
able to ﬁnd someone who can extract only γlC > 1, where γl < γh. While these
two organizational forms diﬀer with respect to the ability to ﬁnd a substitute for an
entrepreneur, both a globally operating banker and a local bank manager will yield
the same liquidation proceeds L.
The beneﬁt of setting up foreign subsidiaries against providing cross-border ﬁnancial
services is therefore an improvement in the ability to collect loans. The drawback
is that it also requires an active internal capital market, i.e. a mechanism by which
funds have to be allocated across subsidiaries at t = 1 (and reallocated at t = 2).
As will be shown, this mechanism suﬀers from an additional ineﬃciency, as local
bank managers in Toulouse and Torino have superior private information. Hence,
they cannot commit to always fully pass on to other agents inside the bank what
they can squeeze out of the entrepreneur.
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3 Cross-border ﬁnancial services
At t = 0, the globally operating banker in London raises funds from outside in-
vestors in Toulouse and in Torino. Investors provide these funds either by means of
demandable deposits or equity capital. Accordingly, we diﬀerentiate depositors from
bank shareholders. Contestability of the banking market implies that the banker
is forced to commit herself at t = 0 to pay out the maximum pledgeable amount
to initial investors at t = 1. Given that investors can also invest into a storage
technology, they will supply their funds only if expected repayments at least cover
this opportunity cost.
Since all agents perfectly anticipate that half of the projects will be late and that
a suﬃciently rich new generation of investors will emerge—although in one country
only—there is no aggregate risk for the bank as a whole. The need to issue equity
shares therefore arises from regulatory requirements only, implying that a bank’s
actual capital-to-asset ratio does not vary over time.
After raising funds, the banker grants loans to entrepreneurs in Toulouse and Torino.
At t = 1, investors need to consume. Depositors can simply withdraw their deposits.
In the course of renegotiations, shareholders can force the banker to pay them out
half of the available liquidity (net of deposits). Liquidity available at t = 1 for
meeting the demands of investors has three sources. First, early entrepreneurs will
each repay γlC to the banker, which gives the banker some internally generated
funds at hand. Second, the banker may raise liquidity by means of liquidating a
share λ of late projects, which gives her 1
2λL. Third, she may also borrow against her
future loan earnings from those late projects that will not be liquidated prematurely.
In this case she will collect 1
2(1−λ)γlC at date t = 2 from remaining late projects.4
But what she can borrow against her remaining claims on entrepreneurs depends on
the capital-to-asset ratio k1 that holds between t = 1 and t = 2, which is deﬁned as








where d1 denotes the volume of deposits raised from investors at t = 1. The nu-
merator in the left fraction is thus the value of what shareholders can expect to
extract from the banker, while the denominator is the total value of the bank from
an investors’ perspective.
Payments to depositors at t = 2 are thus given by d1 = 1
2
1−k




1+k(1 − λ)γlC. In total, the banker can commit herself to pay
4 A natural question is where these fresh funds come from at t = 1. Diamond and Rajan
(2005) argue that new depositors are those entrepreneurs who have already ﬁnished their
projects at t = 1 and can thus reinvest their rents. In line with this view, a regional liquidity
shortage, as the one in our paper, can be characterized by a situation, where in one region the
entrepreneurs with early projects have a common liquidity need. Hence they are not willing





1+kγlC at t = 2 to new investors, who—given their access to storage—will thus be
willing to provide exactly this amount at t = 1.











where W is a value function that maps the liquidation rate λ onto the banker’s
disposable liquidity.
But how many late projects will be prematurely liquidated? Both the banker and
entrepreneurs with late projects prefer borrowing against the late project rather
than liquidating assets: The entrepreneur beneﬁts because he keeps possession of
the assets and is thus able to extract a rent of C−γlC, and the banker gains because
she can extract a rent of
k1
1+k1γlC at t = 2. Investors have the same interests as the
banker if the liquidation value is smaller than what the banker can raise externally by
borrowing against them, i.e. if
γlC
1+k1 > L. Otherwise, i.e. if the imposed capital-to-
asset ratio is too high, a conﬂict of interests between the banker and investors arises
and the banker is tempted to hold up her shareholders. If she tries to renegotiate
with shareholders, the latter will come into possession of loans with probability 0.5
and ask the banker to put loans to their best use. From a shareholders’ perspective
loans are best used when they yield the maximum achievable payment immediately.
Hence, shareholders demand λ = 1 when
γlC
1+k1 < L. The banker will therefore set
λ such that liquidity available to her suﬃces to refrain shareholders from assuming
control over her assets, i.e.
W(λ) ≥ 1
2 [W(1) − d0] + d0, (4)
where, with k0 being the capital-to-asset ratio applied in the ﬁrst period, deposits








Given that the capital-to-asset ratio is the same in each period, i.e. k0 = k1 = ˆ k,
we now conclude:
Proposition 1 When the bank provides cross-border ﬁnancial services, there is no
need to liquidate late projects at t = 1 irrespective of the capital-to-asset ratio.
Proof. See Appendix.
A banker who lends directly abroad will never liquidate loans even when they turn
out to be late, although changes in the capital-to-asset ratio have two opposing
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eﬀects: At ﬁrst, a rising capital-to-asset ratio lowers what the banker can credibly
commit to pay at date t = 2. Hence, the amount of funds a banker can raise
externally at t = 1 by borrowing against late loans decreases, thereby rising the
banker’s need to obtain cash by liquidating loans. At second, an increasing capital-
to-asset ratio also implies that payments to investors to be made at t = 1 decreases
thereby leaving the banker with more internally generated funds even without any
liquidation of loans. Hence, the banker’s leeway to take her own preferred action at
t = 1 (namely keeping the liquidation rate as small as possible) becomes greater as
a higher capital-to-asset ratio gives the banker a higher protection by means of her
rents. According to proposition 1, the latter eﬀect always dominates.
It has thus been shown that the imposition of a regulatory capital requirement does
not aﬀect the ability of an internationally active bank to shield borrowers from
country-speciﬁc liquidity shortages if the bank oﬀers cross-border ﬁnancial services.
The reason is that a globally operating banker can allocate liquidity across countries
without suﬀering from additional internal leakages. These leakages will, however,
be present if there is an imperfectly functioning internal capital market as it is in
the case of multinational banking.
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4 Multinational banking
4.1 Leakages in internal capital markets
The alternative to cross-border ﬁnancial services is multinational banking, a case
where the bank consists of two foreign subsidiaries in Toulouse and Torino. The
beneﬁt of this organizational form is that a local bank manager is better informed
than a globally operating banker about how to make use of a borrower’s assets. This
is because the former has local expertise. The cost is that at the intermediate date
t = 1 a local bank manager may rely on additional funds provided via the internal
capital market to avoid a premature liquidation of loans. The returns on these
funds, however, cannot be fully pledged to the other local bank manager because
of bank-internal enforcement problems. As a consequence, there is a leakage inside
the multinational bank.
We integrate this leakage into the model in the following way. At t = 0, local bank
managers raise funds from local investors and grant loans to entrepreneurs in their
respective regions. At t = 1, all original investors retire, but only one of the two
subsidiaries can raise fresh funds from new investors. Owing to the symmetry of
countries in the model, we can restrict our focus to the case where new investors are
born in Torino. By means of an internal capital market, new funds can in principle
be transferred from Torino to Toulouse. This transfer at t = 1 is hereinafter denoted
by T1.
But how much will the local bank manager in Toulouse repay at t = 2? At this date
she collects 1
4 (1 − µ)γhC from her remaining late projects, where µ is the share
of late projects in Toulouse that have been already liquidated at t = 1. The only
obligation that still exists at t = 2 is the repayment of the transfer. But Toulouse
will repay T1 only if the local bank manager is not better oﬀ by holding up her Torino
counterpart. Assuming that both bank managers will agree on equally sharing the
remaining loan earnings during the course of renegotiations, the Toulouse bank
manager will pay back at most 1
4 (1 − µ)
γhC
2 .5 Transfer repayments T2 are therefore
given by T2 = min{T1, 1
4(1 − µ)
γhC
2 }. To keep things tractable, we also assume
that at t = 1 Torino is to make a one-oﬀ oﬀer regarding the transfer T1, which is
valid only if there are no renegotiations at t = 1 between the local bank manager
in Toulouse and her investors.6 The Toulouse banker can either accept this oﬀer or
not. Our assumption, as made in inequation (1) thus implies that, given the leakage
5 The assumption that the peer bank manager has the same bargaining power as external
shareholders is made for the sake of simplicity only. Similar results will hold as long as a
banker cannot fully extract loan earnings from her counterpart.
6 This is also not crucial. If investors were also allowed to collect the transfer, they would be
obliged to pay it back to Torino at t = 2. Given that investors need to consume at t = 1, either
the transfer has no value to them (when they store it for later repayment) or the supporting
banker is unwilling to make the transfer (when investors do not store but consume).
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in internal capital markets, the liquidation of late projects in Toulouse instead of
postponing loan repayments is generally worthwhile.
Against this background, three questions arise. First, how does the oﬀered transfer
T1 aﬀect the liquidation policy in Toulouse? Second, in anticipation of the induced
liquidation policy, what transfer T1 will be oﬀered by Torino and how many projects
will be liquidated in Torino? And ﬁnally, what eﬀect does a minimum capital-to-
asset ratio have on liquidation policies in both regions? We answer these questions
stepwise.
4.2 Liquidation policy in Toulouse
As regards the ﬁrst question, one has to take into account that Toulouse has two
strategic objectives. First, by the choice of µ she inﬂuences what she has to repay
to Torino at t = 2. For example, when she has already called in all loans to
entrepreneurs with late projects there are no loan earnings left at t = 2 and she
will then save on any repayment to Torino.7 Second, while oﬀering a liquidation
rate µ, the banker takes into account that shareholders may refuse this oﬀer and
enter into renegotiations. When renegotiations take place, the transfer T1 is no
longer available and the banker and shareholders are each to make a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer with equal probability. When shareholders assume control over the
loans, they force the banker to generate the maximum liquidity that is immediately
available, i.e. to set µ = 1.
Let V denote the value function that maps the liquidation rate µ and the oﬀered
transfer T1 onto the liquidity available to the Toulouse bank manager at t = 1:
V (µ,T1) := 1
4γ
hC + 1
4µL + T1. (7)
With d0 being the volume of deposits raised at t = 0, investors then expect to
get 1
2 [V (1,0) − d0] + d0 if d0 ≤ V (1,0) or (almost) nothing otherwise (because in
this case depositors will run, implying that the value of the banker’s assets will
completely melt down). The banker prevents investors from rejecting her oﬀer ˆ µ if
V (ˆ µ,T1) ≥ 1
2 [V (1,0) + d0] (8)
or











7 Assuming that the banker liquidates loans in order to keep repayments to Torino t = 2 as low
as possible may appear to be somewhat awkward. However, in the sense of Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales (2000) the banker might be seen to have an alternative, so-called defensive investment
opportunity, which fully protects her against future claims of other subsidiary managers.
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R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ) s.t. (8), (10)
with her rents R1(ˆ µ) and R2(ˆ µ) being given by
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L + T1 − 1
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4 (1 − ˆ µ)
γhC
2 .
The solution to program (10) is:
Lemma 1 Let M denote the function that maps the oﬀered transfer T1 and the
volume of deposits d0 onto the fraction µ∗ of late projects that will be prematurely




































































L > 0 otherwise
(15)
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure1 illustrates these ﬁndings. There, the dark area displays those combinations
of deposits d0 and the oﬀered transfer T1, where Toulouse sets µ∗ = 0. In that
area, a zero liquidation rate suﬃces to prevent investors from assuming control over
the bank’s assets. This is because deposits are suﬃciently low while the transfer is
suﬃciently high to give the banker enough bargaining power and funds at hand to
enforce her own interests. At the same time, the transfer is not too high in this area
such that it does not pay for the banker to liquidate loans in order to strategically
improve her bargaining position for renegotiations with Torino at t = 2.
In the white area, the banker will liquidate all late loans prematurely, i.e. µ∗ = 1,
for one of the following three reasons: First, when deposits d0 are higher than
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Figure 1: Liquidation regimes for the liquidity-poor region.
1
4(γhC + L), the bank manager cannot raise enough liquidity to prevent investors
from assuming control over her assets without setting ˆ µ = 1 even though she gets
a transfer T1. Second, even when deposits are small and the banker in Toulouse
has thus suﬃcient power vis-a-vis investors to keep the liquidation rate small, she
will set µ∗ = 1 if the transfer T1 oﬀered by Torino is higher than 1
4(γhC − L).
This is because it is then best for the bank manager in Toulouse to collect the
transfer and to liquidate all loans, as she will not have to pay back anything to
Torino at t = 2. Third, when deposits d0 are neither small nor too large, i.e. if
3
4(γhC − L) ≤ d0 ≤ 1
4(γhC + L) the banker is generally forced to liquidate some of
her loans in order to meet the demands of investors as payments owed to depositors
imply that the banker is only weakly protected vis-a-vis her investors by her rents.
When, however, the transfer T1 is relatively high, it is even better for her to liquidate
not only some but all of her loans. In so doing she shifts her rents completely to
t = 1. This strategy is advantageous because, as the share of loans being called in
is already high, rents extractable at the expense of Torino at t = 2 would be small.
Hence, it is best for her to collect the transfer and to liquidate all late loans and to
keep what has been left after repaying investors at t = 1.
Finally, in the gray area the banker calls in some of her loans to borrowers with
late projects, i.e. µ∗ > 0. In so doing, investors will be just indiﬀerent to accept
that oﬀer, while—as T1 is comparatively small in this area—it neither pays for the
banker to head for renegotiations with Torino nor does it allow her to completely
avoid the premature liquidation of assets.
4.3 Liquidation and transfer policy in Torino
Having analyzed the liquidation policy in Toulouse, we next turn to the issues of
how many projects will be liquidated in Torino and what transfer will be oﬀered
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to Toulouse. In so doing, we bear in mind that, according to the Basel framework,
capital requirements will be applied on a consolidated basis to internationally active
banks and to all internationally active banks at every tier within a banking group,
also on a fully consolidated basis. In our setting, this means that only the interna-
tionally active bank as a whole is required to meet capital regulations at each point
in time.
To begin with, we have to determine how much liquidity is available to the Torino
bank manager at t = 1 to pay out her impatient investors and to make the transfer.
She obtains 1
4γhC as returns from early projects and 1
4νL as proceeds from liqui-
dating a share ν of her late projects. In addition, she may raise funds externally
from newly born investors by borrowing against her remaining late loans and against
what she will get repaid from Toulouse at t = 2.
Given that the local bank manager in Torino oﬀers a transfer T1 to Toulouse, liq-

















where U is a value function mapping the rate ν of prematurely liquidated projects
in Torino and the transfer payment T1 onto the value of liquidity (from investors
perspective), taking into account the liquidation policy of the Toulouse bank man-
ager.
As the capital-to-asset ratio k1, applied between t = 1 and t = 2, determines the
returns on borrowing against late projects rather than liquidating them, we have to
distinguish between high and low capital-to-asset ratios. When the capital-to-asset
ratio k1 is small and satisﬁes
0 ≤ k1 ≤
γhC
L − 1, (17)
then the local bank manager as well as investors in Torino do not want to have
late loans in Torino to be prematurely liquidated, i.e. ν = 0. When the imposed
capital-to-asset ratio is, however, too large, investors want the banker to liquidate
all late projects in Torino, while the banker still prefers a continuation of all late
projects.
Besides the liquidation rate, there may be an additional conﬂict of interest between
the local bank manager and investors, which refers to the transfer T1 oﬀered to
Toulouse. The bank manager is in principle indiﬀerent regarding the transfer—as
long as it does not make her counterpart in Toulouse set µ∗ = 1. This follows from
inspecting the respective rents Q1(T1,ν) and Q2(T1,ν) of the Torino bank manager
Q1(T1,ν) = U (T1,ν) − 1
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− 1
2d0 − T1 if M(T1) = 1.
(18)
Hence, as long as T1 does not induce the Toulouse bank manager to liquidate all late
loans, changes in the transfer T1 merely imply a one-to-one shift of rents between
the two dates. If, however, T1 already incites the Toulouse bank manager to call
in all loans, a further increase in the transfer T1 implies lower rents for the Torino
bank manager as she would simply waste funds when nothing could be recovered
from Toulouse. In accordance with these insights, we assume for the remainder
of this paper that the Torino bank manager is in principle willing to supply the
highest value of T1 for which the Toulouse bank manager will marginally abstain
from setting the liquidation rate equal to 1.8
However, making a transfer is not only a matter of willingness of the Torino bank
manager, but also a matter of her capability to get it accepted by her investors.
These investors always want T1 = 0 because making no transfers maximizes the
available liquidity and, therefore, investors utility at t = 1, as the latter is always


















Therefore, investors in Torino cannot gain from transferring funds across regions.
Keeping in mind that the bank manager is at best indiﬀerent with respect to the
transfer while she does strictly prefer to not liquidating late projects, her prefer-
ences are strictly ordered. First of all she seeks to minimize the liquidation rate ν,
and only if she is able to enforce ν = 0 vis-a-vis her investors, she will think about
making a transfer to Toulouse. Given the aforementioned structure of the renegoti-
ations game between a local bank manager and her investors, the latter can extract
1
2 [U (0,0) + d0] from the Torino bank manager if (17) is met, and 1
2 [U (0,1) + d0]
otherwise. The bank manager has, therefore, to create suﬃcient liquidity in order
to restrain investors from assuming control over her loans. Her choice of T1 is thus
restricted by
U (T1,0) ≥ 1
2 [U (0,0) + d0] if 0 ≤ k1 ≤
γhC
L − 1, (20)
8 At t = 0, neither local bank manager knows whether she or her peer will be short of liquidity
at t = 1. Ex post, the Torino bank manager will be indiﬀerent about the size of the transfer;
ex ante, however, she may also beneﬁt most from the highest possible transfer. So there might




U (T1,0) ≥ 1
2 [U (0,1) + d0] if
γhC
L − 1 ≤ k1 ≤ 1. (21)












To sum up we have
Lemma 2 The transfer policy T ∗





























We thus ﬁnd that transfers, oﬀered to Toulouse, must not be too large for two
reasons. First, it needs to be small to make the Torino bank manager willing to
make the transfer. If, instead, the transfer implies that the Toulouse bank manger
has an incentive to liquidate all of her late projects, funds transferred to Toulouse
would simply be wasted. The volume of deposits d0 inﬂuences the willingness of the
Torino bank manager to oﬀer a transfer as large deposits imply that Toulouse needs
a lot of funds at t = 1. The local bank manager there has then to liquidate already
some of her late projects such that even small transfers may induce her to liquidate
all of them to save on the repayment of the transfer.
Second, the transfer needs to be small to let the Torino counterpart being able to
make this transfer. When, for instance, the Torino bank manager has already to oﬀer
a lot of liquidity to her investors (because of large deposits) in order to avoid a run
on her loans, only little is left to support her Toulouse counterpart. In addition, for
a given volume of deposits, an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio k1, which governs
the bank’s capital structure between the two dates t = 1 and t = 2, also implies a
lower transfer at t = 1. The reason here is that the bank manager cannot raise as
much liquidity externally by borrowing against late projects. This may force her to
cut transfers, especially if the capital-to-asset ratio creates an additional conﬂict of
interests regarding the liquidation of late projects in Torino.
Before proceeding, we need to point out two further restrictions implied by the
model. First, deposits d0 cannot be made contingent on the occurrence of liquidity
shortages. Hence, payments, which a local bank manager owes to depositors, have
to be the same in each region. Second, deposits d0 must not be larger than V (1,0).
If deposits were above V (1,0), a liquidity shortage in one region would trigger a
bank run on the subsidiary based in that region. Investors had therefore to expect
that with probability 0.5 their funds deposited with the bank could not be repaid.
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4.4 Capital structure and internal capital markets
The next task is to analyze the eﬀects of the bank’s capital structure on the re-
spective liquidation policies in Torino and Toulouse, and we proceed in three steps.
First, we determine how much funds can be raised at t = 0 by issuing deposits,
depending on the minimum capital-to-asset ratio imposed by regulation. Second,
given this relationship, we derive the transfer actually made at t = 1. Knowing
how deposits issued at t = 0 and the transfer made at t = 1 will depend on capital
structure, we ﬁnally draw conclusions about the eﬀect of capital regulation on the
share of prematurely liquidated projects in each region.
To begin with, with ˆ k being the minimum capital-to-asset ratio imposed by the
regulator and with deposits being the same in both regions and bounded above by






when ˆ k = k1 is suﬃciently small in order to not creating an incentive problem
regarding ν.9 For larger capital-to-asset ratios we have to take into account the







Solving (24) and (25) for d0 allows us to determine how much funds the bank can






























0 if ˆ k ≤ α,
− 7+3ˆ k
8(1+ˆ k)3γhC − L









9 The model thus implies that the actual capital-to-asset ratio in the ﬁrst period will be strictly
positive and decreasing in the minimum capital-to-asset ratio, as long as the latter is not
already binding at t = 0. The reason is that the bank has to shield itself from a liquidity
risk, which arises in the presence of a region-speciﬁc liquidity shortage when the internal
capital market works ineﬃciently. This need to cushion liquidity risk becomes, however, less
important for tighter capital requirements because the bank cannot raise as much liquidity
externally at t = 1, which lowers her obligations vis-a-vis initial investors. Since the markets
for deposits and other claims on a bank are contestable, the bankers have no incentive to
exceed capital requirements in the case where additional capital is not needed to cushion
liquidity shocks
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holds true. Hence, α is strictly positive but smaller than
γhC
L − 1.
Equation (26) says that the bank can issue deposits up to a maximum of
γhC+L
4 .
If deposits were larger, the bank would fail in one region with certainty at t = 1,
and depositors would thus expect getting nothing back from the bank at t = 1 with
probability 0.5.10 When the imposed capital-to-asset ratio becomes suﬃciently large















A further increase in ˆ k has in principle two eﬀects on deposits. First, it reduces what
shareholders collect when they assume control over assets as the banker can borrow
less against late loans. The value of capital thus falls and, in order to meet the
tightening in capital requirements, deposits also decrease. Second, even for a given
amount that shareholders can collect, deposits must decrease as the banker’s ability
to extract rents builds an obstacle for meeting an increasing capital requirement
by issuing more equity shares. The ﬁrst eﬀect, however, only exists if the imposed
capital-to-asset ratio remains suﬃciently small to not creating the additional conﬂict
of interest regarding the share of prematurely liquidated projects in the liquidity-
rich region. Otherwise, shareholders will demand to not borrowing against these
projects but to liquidate them. Thus, the value of capital does not further decrease
with tighter capital requirements. Deposits decrease only because of the banker’s
inability to meet those capital requirements by issuing equity shares.
Knowing the relationship between capital requirements and the volume of deposits
issued at t = 0, we can next derive what transfer will actually be made at t = 1.
According to lemma 2, there will be no transfer at least when Ω = 0, which occurs
to happen when deposits equal
γhC+L
4 —that is, when the capital regulation is not
too strong and ˆ k ≤ α holds. When ˆ k > α, we know from (26) that deposits d∗
0





. There is thus room for oﬀering a transfer as
the banker is now willing to do so. But she might not be able to get it accepted
by her investors. However, the transfer will actually never be restricted by those
investors. Inserting d∗
0 according to (26) into the constraint imposed by investors
yields for ˆ k ∈ (α,
γhC
L −1] that Ψ equals
(1+7ˆ k+4ˆ k2)γhC−(1−ˆ k2)L
16ˆ k(1+ˆ k) , which is positive and
strictly decreasing in ˆ k.11 Hence, investors’ demands are not a binding constraint












16ˆ k2(1+ˆ k)2 , which is strictly
negative, since L < γhC and ˆ k ≥ 0.
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, which is strictly
higher than 1
4(γhC − L). For even larger ˆ k, Ψ is given by
(1+k)γhC−L
4k1 , which is at
least 1
4(2γhC − L) and thus also higher than 1
4(γhC − L).
The capital structure thus aﬀects the actual transfer to a bank subsidiary that
suﬀers from a liquidity shortage. When the capital-to-asset ratio imposed by the
regulator is small, i.e. if ˆ k ≤ α, deposits are too large to allow any transfer. With
minimum capital-to-asset ratios being of intermediate values, the bank manager in
the liquidity-rich region will to some extent support her counterpart, where this
support will be higher for tighter capital regulation. But there is a non-negative
capital-to-asset ratio, above which it does not pay to further extend ﬁnancial support
as the bank manager in the liquidity-poor region is already allowed to keep all of
her late projects. This leads us to to the following conclusion.
Proposition 2 When the internationally active bank operates as a multinational
bank, the resulting liquidation policy is given by
ν
∗ = 0 (28)
and
µ∗ = 1 if ˆ k ≤ α
µ∗ < 1 if ˆ k ∈ (α,β]




∂ˆ k < 0 for ˆ k ∈ (α,β]
∂µ∗
∂ˆ k = 0 otherwise
. (30)















Proposition 2 is one of the central results of the paper. It shows that a multinational
bank operating through local subsidiaries may be forced to liquidate projects with
positive NPV. Although local bank managers would be able to squeeze more out of
these projects than a globally operating banker ever could, a multinational bank’s
internal capital market does not always allow to reallocate liquidity properly across
countries. The need to raise liquidity locally by means of liquidating projects, how-
ever, is less compelling when the capital-to-asset ratio is higher. The reason is that
a higher capital-to-asset ratio gives more power to a local bank manager to bring
the actual liquidation policy in line with her own interests.
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5 Implications
The ﬁnal step in our analysis is to compare the two organizational forms of inter-
national banking activities and to further discuss the results. To begin with, we
contrast two potential measures for the value of diﬀerent organizational forms. On
the one hand, one may argue that an organization design is socially optimal, when
it allows the maximum number of projects with a positive NPV to be ﬁnanced and
orderly ﬁnished, irrespective how their returns are distributed among agents. On the
other hand, as markets for bank deposits and other claims on a bank are contestable,
a prerequisite for a bank to enter foreign markets is to design its organizational form
such that expected repayments to initial investors are maximized. Since banks are
forced to make this decision irrespective of any social welfare considerations, there
might be the case that these two measures point to diﬀerent directions and a pru-
dent policy of regulating bank capital may eﬀectively work in order to bring them
into line.
The market solution—that is, the organizational form that emerges when markets
for claims on banks are contestable—is characterized by
Proposition 3 Supplying cross-border ﬁnancial services allows higher repayments
to initial investors when the capital-to-asset ratio imposed by a regulator is not too







holds. In all other cases, multinational banking dominates in terms of expected
repayments to initial investors.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to this proposition, a necessary condition, for which the provision of cross-
border ﬁnancial services is associated with higher repayments to initial investors, is
thus a small regulatory capital-to-asset ratio. Intuitively, if this ratio would be high,
liquidity could be allocated across regions by a multinational bank in a similar way
as by means of cross-border ﬁnancial services because the restrictions on transfers
between a multinational bank’s subsidiaries would be of no relevance. There is thus
no additional cost, but the multinational bank can still take its advantage of being
better informed, which allows to create more liquidity.
However, even if the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio is small, multinational banks
may squeeze those banks oﬀering cross-border ﬁnancial services out of the market.
Only when (32) holds true, cross-border ﬁnancial services will yield higher repay-
ments at least for ˆ k = 0. This condition is more likely to hold if a globally operating
banker can already extract much by continuing late projects compared to liquidation
(i.e. if γlC − L is large), and/or if the additional liquidity created by local bank
managers is comparatively small (i.e., if γh − γl is small).
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An important aspect of proposition 3 is that the market solution might not cor-
respond to a social optimum. For the borrowing entrepreneurs the advantage of
multinational banking is that it improves their ability to commit themselves to
repay their debt, which tends to ease their borrowing constraints ex ante. The dis-
advantage is that, ex post, they have to face a premature liquidation of their assets
when their projects turn out to be late. For example, if (32) is not met and if
there is no regulatory capital-to-asset ratio, multinational banking will yield higher
repayments than cross-border ﬁnancial services but brings about that 25 percent of
all projects will be prematurely liquidated, whereas no projects would be liquidated
in the case of cross-border ﬁnancial services.
Multinational banking may thus also come along with an increase in risks to ﬁnancial
stability. When investors prefer multinational banking although the imposed capital-
to-asset ratio implies µ∗ = 1, one subsidiary has to be closed, whereas in the case
of cross-border ﬁnancial services the bank always survives. This contrasts to, e.g.,
Allen and Gale (2000) who argue that (almost) perfectly integrated ﬁnancial systems
do not suﬀer from ﬁnancial instability when there is no aggregate liquidity risk.
Our model shows that there is such a risk even when ﬁnancial systems are most
intensively integrated via multinational banks.12
There is thus a potential for capital regulation. When multinational banking dom-
inates and when this comes along with some late projects being prematurely liqui-
dated, there will be an ineﬃcient use of funds in the sense of forgoing returns and,
sometimes, even a failure of a bank subsidiary. A cautious increase in the regulatory
minimum capital-to-asset ratio may lower the share of liquidated projects. However,
this procedure requires the regulator having an intimate and quantitative knowledge
of the interlinkages of the markets for bank loans and deposits, the markets for bank
capital, and the banks’ internal allocation processes. Otherwise the regulator risks
that banks cannot provide any cross-border liquidity insurance, because they are
given too little incentives to repay investors the gross return on alternative assets.
Said diﬀerently, a precondition for a prudent policy of bank capital regulation is
to estimate not only the risks on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, but also
risks that stem from the liability side. Both risks may interact and even cause each
other (Diamond and Rajan, 2005). In this paper we have been able to show that,
even in this case of identical risks to asset values, the assessment of the overall risks
should also be made contingent on the bank’s organization design. Imposing a one-
design-ﬁts-all capital-to-asset ratio, as done by the Basel framework, may thus be
inappropriate.
12 In contrast to Fecht and Gr¨ uner (2005), an interbank money market is not able to allocate
liquidity eﬃciently here. The reason is that a regional bank that suﬀers from a liquidity
shortage cannot simply borrow from another region’s bank without violating minimum capital
requirements as this borrowed liquidity does not belong to regulatory capital measures. But
as the bank fails to meet capital requirements, it will be closed by the regulator.
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6 Summary
In this paper we have analyzed the role of bank capital regulation for the internation-
alization strategy of banks. First, we have derived conditions under which it pays
for an internationally active bank to set up subsidiaries abroad instead of supplying
cross-border ﬁnancial services. The argument is that, by setting up a subsidiary,
a bank can create more liquidity but has to rely on a bank-internal mechanism in
order to allocate liquidity in the case of country-speciﬁc liquidity shocks. These
allocations take place on an internal capital market. They are, however, associated
with some leakages, as local bank managers cannot fully pledge their future loan
earnings—not even to another bank manager inside the same multinational bank-
ing ﬁrm. Owing to this imperfection, a bank’s subsidiary suﬀering from a liquidity
shortage may be forced to call in (some of) her loans prematurely, or even to get
closed. Therefore, when deciding upon its internationalization strategy, a bank faces
a trade-oﬀ between creating and allocating liquidity and prefers setting up foreign
subsidiaries only if the ability to create more liquidity outweighs the additional costs
from its ineﬃcient allocation.
Second, we have shown that capital regulation aﬀects this trade-oﬀ in two ways.
On the one hand, stronger capital requirements lower the ability of a bank to cre-
ate liquidity irrespective of the chosen internationalization strategy. On the other
hand, they also mitigate the ineﬃciencies in internal capital markets in the case
of multinational banking. This is because high capital requirements buﬀer against
country-speciﬁc liquidity shocks, thereby lowering the need to meet liquidity de-
mands of impatient investors and reducing the disincentives of a local bank manager
to refuse repaying bank internal transfers. Though the regulation of the interna-
tional convergence of capital measurement and capital standards does not explicitly
discriminate the modes of foreign market entry, it may therefore still aﬀect the re-
spective strategic decision of banks. This result adds to the literature on the eﬀects
of banking regulation on banks’ internationalization strategies, which basically ar-
gues that those regulations have an impact on banks’ strategic decisions because
they do discriminate one mode of foreign market entry against the other.13
Finally, we have been able to uncover eﬀects of diﬀerent internationalization strate-
gies on the stability and eﬃciency of the international banking system. Though
banks oﬀering cross-border ﬁnancial services cannot create much liquidity, they
do not put the banking sector at risk because they are able to allocate liquidity
eﬃciently across regions, irrespective of capital regulation. Multinational banks,
however, though able to create more liquidity, cannot pass it on to investors when
imperfections in internal capital markets are severe. Hence, these banks also face
substantial risks to their stability as they cannot handle region-speciﬁc liquidity
13 Repullo (2001), e.g., analyzes how diﬀering national deposit insurance systems inﬂuence a
bank’s incentives for cross-border mergers, while Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) mention
the role of country-speciﬁc market entry regulations for banks opening foreign branches instead
of setting up subsidiaries abroad.
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shocks properly. Given this, the eﬀect of capital regulation on the stability and eﬃ-
ciency of the international banking system is not clear-cut. On the one hand, it may
incite banks to do their business abroad by means of multinational banking instead
of cross-border ﬁnancial services, meaning that the risk of premature liquidations
increases. On the other hand, as increasing capital-to-asset ratios lowers the need
to liquidate projects prematurely in the case of multinational banking, it can also
improve on stability and eﬃciency.
Further research could be directed to an in-depth assessment of the role of interna-
tionally active banks for the stability of the global ﬁnancial system. One issue in
this respect is whether internationally active banks act as stabilizers in times of se-
vere ﬁnancial distress or whether they form an additional risk of contagion. Though
ﬁnancial crisis are very costly events, one may consider them as being rather rare.
But our understanding of the role of internationally active banks in even less ex-
treme scenarios is far from being comprehensive. For example, little is known about
how these banks contribute to the international transmission of business cycles. By
getting deeper into those and related issues, one may draw a more complete picture
of what is going on nowadays in an integrated world economy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
When
γlC
1+ˆ k ≥ L, i.e. ˆ k ≤
γlC
L − 1, there is no conﬂict of interests between the
globally operating banker and investors as both do not want to liquidate and thus
prefer λ = 0. When, however,
γlC
1+ˆ k < L, i.e. ˆ k >
γlC
L − 1, there is such a conﬂict of
interest. With
γlC
1+ˆ k < L the function W is strictly increasing in λ. In order to show
that λ = 0 holds irrespective of ˆ k, it then suﬃces to prove that W(0) >
W(1)
1+ˆ k for all
ˆ k ∈ (
γlC















which holds true because of 1 > 1
1+ˆ k and γlC > L.
Proof of Lemma 1
To solve program (10) consider ﬁrst the sum of rents
R1(ˆ µ)+R2(ˆ µ) = 3
8γ

















which has the following property
d
dˆ µ
(R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ)) =
 
1
4(L − γhC) < 0 if T1 < 1






2 ) > 0 if T1 ≥ 1







(R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ)) =
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We proceed by distinguishing four cases:
Case 1
If deposits d0 are too large while the transfer T1 is too small, depositors hold such a
high claim on the banker that no liquidation rate smaller than 1 allows the banker
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to raise enough funds that investors can be deterred from forcing the banker to
liquidate all late loans. Formally, there is no ˆ µ < 1 satisfying (9), i.e.
1
2(L−γhC)+2d0−4T1
L ≥ 1 (39)











Hence µ∗ is equal to 1 for any T1 satisfying (40).
Case 2





holds, it follows that the bank manager’s rents are maximized by choosing µ∗ = 1,
since for all ˆ µ > 0 we have, according to (36),
d
dˆ µ
(R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ)) > 0. (42)
It is thus optimal for the bank manager to set µ∗ = 1, even though a ˆ µ, which
satisﬁes constraint (8) with equality, is smaller than 1. The reason here is that T1
is too large, so the banker has an incentive to liquidate all late loans for strategic
reasons: She simply pockets the high transfer T1 at t = 1, but she is not inclined to
repay it at t = 2.
For the remaining two cases, neither the condition for case 1 nor that for case 2
















If both the constraint (8) is slack for ˆ µ = 0 and if
R1(0) + R2(0) ≥ R1(1) + R2(1) (44)
is fulﬁlled, the bank manager will set µ∗ = 0.
To begin with, constraint (8) will not be binding for ˆ µ = 0 if
1
4γ
























































where—owing to assumption (1)—we have γhC − L <
γhC























Consider the case where T1 ≤ 1
4
γhC
2 holds true but constraint (8) is violated for
µ = 0. Investors then require the banker to choose µ ≥ ˆ µ where ˆ µ is implicitly





Hence, as a consequence of the property (36) of R1(µ) + R2(µ), the banker will set
µ∗ = ˆ µ only if
R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ) ≥ R1(1) + R2(1) (51)
holds and sets µ∗ = 1 otherwise. Since ˆ µ is deﬁned as that µ for which available
liquidity at t = 1 is just about the liquidity demanded by investors (i.e. for which
condition (8) holds with equality), we have R1(ˆ µ) = 0 and condition (51) can be
rewritten as
1














+ T1 − 1
2d0. (52)
We know from (37) that
R1(ˆ µ) + R2(ˆ µ) < R1(1) + R2(1) (53)






We therefore have µ∗ = 1 if T1 satisﬁes (54). But if this condition is violated, we
have T1 ≤ 1
4 (1 − ˆ µ)
γhC
2 . In this case (52) reads as
1
4 (1 − ˆ µ)γ














hC − L), (55)






hC − L) (56)





hC − L) (57)




Comparing the parameter ranges in (40), (43), (49) and (57) yields that (40) is
































Proof of Proposition 2
The proof regarding ν∗ is as follows. Since Ψ is not binding for determining T1,
and because satisfying Ψ already allows the local bank manager to enforce ν = 0,
the bank manager in the liquidity-rich region has no problems to avoid a premature
liquidation of loans.
The proof regarding µ∗ is by distinguishing two cases:
1. When ˆ k ≤ α, deposits d∗
0 are equal to
γhC+L
4 . Thus, according to lemma 2,
there will be no transfer and it follows from lemma 1 that µ∗ = 1.
2. When ˆ k > α, deposits are smaller than
γhC+L
4 and monotonically decreasing













0 = 0, the intermediate value theorem implies that there is a critical capital-

























for any ˆ k < β. There is thus no need to liquidate loans at all if ˆ k ≥ β, i.e.
µ∗ = 0. For intermediate capital-to-asset ratios satisfying ˆ k ∈ (α,β) we have
µ∗ ∈ (0,1). In this case, d∗
0 decreases as ˆ k increases, which allows for higher
transfers. Both, lower deposits and higher transfers, lead to a lower µ∗ as
shown in lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Expected repayments to initial investors depend on the imposed capital-to-asset
ratio and are given by table1. We will show that a necessary condition for re-
payments associated with cross-border ﬁnancial services being higher than those
associated with multinational banking is that the imposed capital-to-asset ratio ˆ k is
suﬃciently small. Moreover, an increasing capital-to-asset ratio will make the pro-
vision of cross-border ﬁnancial services less favorable. Once multinational banking
dominates for some capital-to-asset ratio, there will be no ˆ k beyond that ratio where
cross-border ﬁnancial services will dominate again.
deposits equity capital sum
multinational banking





α < ˆ k ≤
γhC


















0 < ˆ k ≤
γlC

















Table 1: Expected repayments to initial investors
Since the critical capital-to-asset ratio α can be higher than
γlC
L −1 or not, we have
to distinguish two cases.
Case 1
Suppose that α ≤
γlC
L − 1 holds.
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1. We start with capital-to-asset ratios satisfying 0 < ˆ k ≤ α. Cross-border




1 + ˆ k
−
3V (1,0) + U (0,0)
2
> 0. (59)
In what follows we show that (59) reaches its maximum at ˆ k = 0 and that this
maximum is strictly positive if and only if 3
5 > (γh−γl)C
γlC−L .
(a) Diﬀerentiating the expression in (59) yields
d
dˆ k




8ˆ k+4ˆ k2+4 −
(3+ˆ k)γl
3ˆ k+3ˆ k2+ˆ k3+1
 
. (60)




(8ˆ k+4ˆ k2+4)(3+ˆ k)
3ˆ k+3ˆ k2+ˆ k3+1 . (61)
This is true as the RHS in (61) is at least 8, while the LHS is smaller
than 2. The latter is implied by assumption (1), which requires ﬁrstly
that γhC < 2L, or, equivalently,
γh
γl < 2L
γlC, and secondly γlC > L, or,
equivalently 2L
γlC < 2.









It can easily be checked that this condition holds for at least some pa-
rameters, for instance for γh and γl being very close to each other.
2. When α < ˆ k ≤
γlC







1 + ˆ k
−
V (1,0) + U (0,0)
1 + ˆ k
> 0. (63)










1+ˆ k C − [W(0) − V (1,0) − U(0,0)]
 
1 + ˆ k
 2 , (64)
which is strictly negative for ∆
α<ˆ k≤
γlC
L −1 ≥ 0. This, however, means that cross-
border ﬁnancial services are associated with higher repayments if multinational
banking has not already become dominant for some ˆ k ≤ α. In that case it
also means that the comparative advantage of cross-border ﬁnancial services
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over multinational banking further declines when ˆ k increases. Moreover, once
multinational banking dominates for some capital-to-asset ratio, there will be




L − 1 < ˆ k cross-border ﬁnancial services will always yield lower re-
payments than multinational banking. If ˆ k ≤
γhC
















1 + ˆ k
< 0 (65)
while for ˆ k >
γhC
L − 1 we have
∆ γhC














L − 1 < α holds.
1. If 0 < ˆ k ≤
γlC
L −1, cross-border ﬁnancial services will be associated with higher






1 + ˆ k
−
3V (1,0) + U (0,0)
2
> 0. (67)
By the same arguments as in Case 1, ﬁrst part, the diﬀerence in repayments






L − 1 < ˆ k ≤ α, cross-border ﬁnancial services will never yield higher
repayments because
∆ γlC
L −1<ˆ k≤α =
2W (1) −
 
1 + ˆ k
 
[3V (1,0) + U (0,0)]
2
 
1 + ˆ k
  < 0. (68)
3. By the same arguments as in Case 1, third part, cross-border ﬁnancial services
will always yield lower repayments than multinational banking when α < ˆ k .
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